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“All this said, patents and other intellectual property rights can be
sources of genuine antitrust problems, a possibility obscured by 
the fact that patent monopolies in an economically meaningful
sense can coexist with competition in its sense of rivalry…” 
(Landes and Posner, 2003).
“Patent policy is truly the kingdom of unintended consequences”
(Jaffe and Lerner, 2004)  
In our XXI Century globalized economy, innovation, antitrust issues and
(new) intellectual property rules are in the forefront of every government,
large company and policy making debates, North or South (Wells: 2002).
From the perspective of competition policy, catch-up initiatives and institu-
tional design, there is no way to circumvent those matters. The available
perspectives to deal with Antitrust are the so called “Harvard-Scholl” (or
Prophets of Regulation School. Mc Craw: 1984) and the, now hegemonic,
“Chicago Scholl” (Posner: 1976, 2002, Bork: 1993, Hovenkamp: 1999).
The former has as its working models the imperfect competition models of
neoclassical economics and the market failure’s approach carrying, there-
fore, a deep suspicion about bigness, mergers and business cooperation in
general. The latter’s main focus is consumer’s welfare and it has efficiency
as its core concept. Additionally, the Chicago school is, from a political
economy point of view, rooted in a government failure’s perspective
towards public policy
1 and, consequentially, much more libertarian and
much less hostile towards bigness and mergers. 
In its economic dimension it is totally grounded in neoclassical theory as well,
having the perfect competition model as its blueprint with some inputs from
the contestable markets theory – for instance, market power is not taken
very seriously by their main interpreters (Bork, 1993, Hovenkamp: 1999
chap 2). As said, consumer’s welfare and efficiency are its main concerns,
but they are (tentatively) measured in a statical way (Langlois: 2001).  
On the other end, intellectual property issues are, also, in the forefront of
both the policy and politics’ debates (Landes and Posner: 2003, Wu [ed:]
2004, Jaffe and Lerner: 2004). Interestingly enough, the whole new wave
of intellectual property claims is about extending monopoly positions and
market power (the right to patent generic knowledge, business models etc.
cf. Merger: 2003, Coriat, Cimoli and Primi: 2005) to leading firms and, there-
fore, to protect them from… competition (or, to put it in the mainstream lan-
guage: they are designed to create or reinforce… market failures.). 
How do those two building blocks of the new policy landscape interact? It
3
1 One of most important influences in the foundation of that approach was George Stigler; whose
capture theory and influence on what under James Buchanan and Gordon Tullock would become
the rational choice approach is well know.appears that there is no coherent analytical framework to deal with them
2,
and certainly no Schumpeterian perspective on these issues either
3. But
they are central to any meaningful discussion of both catching up initiatives
and development strategies today. This paper aims to be a very preliminary
effort to contribute for a better understanding of the interactions between
Competition policies (rather than antitrust) and Intellectual Property issues
under a schumpeterian perspective and, therefore, towards a more coher-
ent framework within which the discussions of both institutional building
and policy design towards Development can proceed
4.
5
2. Intellectual Property and Dynamic efficiencies and inefficiencies
To begin with, lets state very clearly that from a Schumpeterian perspec-
tive, or in a context of schumpeterian competition, intellectual property
rights (IPRs) are strategic weapons and very powerful tools for generating
sustained competitive advantages and also both schumpeterian and ricar-
dian rents trough patents, trade secrets, confidentiality contracts, copy-
rights trademarks and registered brand names (cf. Teece: 2001 and Jolly
and Philpott, orgs 2004)
6. In the evolutionary economics framework it’s
quite clear that in the absence of legal protection for an invention, the inven-
tor either will have less incentives to innovate or, will try to keep his inven-
tion secret, thus reducing, in both cases, the stock of knowledge to socie-
ty as a whole ( Landes and Posner: p.294). 
4
2 This does not imply shortage of work discussing specific issues in what is called “the economics
of intellectual property rights”. See Menell: 1999 for an excellent survey on general theories of IP.
A very interesting review acknowledging the under researched nature of the theme can be found in
Dixon and Greenhalgh (2002).The shortcomings of most of that work are, from our perspective, due
to its concentration on “data”, “measures” and “testing” with little attention to the theoretical
framework within which they are conducted.
3 This was emphasized by David Teece in 1992 and restated in 2001.There has been some
attempts to deal with this issue from business and legal scholars and policy makers but one cannot
say that they achieved a great deal of success (See for instance Carlton and Gertner: 2002, and
Anthony: 2003). And that includes the otherwise extremely knowledgeable treaty from Landes and
Posner: 2003 (On the relationship between antitrust and IP, see their chapter 14). The leading
schumpeterian-oriented author on that field is certainly Richard Nelson (See for instance, Mazzoleni
and Nelson: 1998 and Nelson et alii: 2004). 
4 Incidentally, it should contribute, as well, to broadening the Schumpeterian research agenda by
directing it into a scarcely explored (in the Schumpeterian domain) territory: that of Law and
Economics. But see Langlois (2001) for an interesting starting point on that direction.
5 F. Scherer (1994, 1996), has dealt consistently with these issues but, we argue, in a much more
Structure-Conduct-Performance approach then in a genuinely Schumpeterian one. The Neo-
Schumpeterian legacy has dealt heavily on competition policies (or how to enforce competition) but
has been saying very little on the relationship among innovation, intellectual property regimes, busi-
ness cooperation and abuses of economic power.
6 Having said that, it is striking how little has been written about this crucial connection, between
schumpeterian competition and IPR. And of course I include myself in that loophole. In that regard,
legal theorists like Landes and Posner are clearly ahead, in the sense that they are already doing the
reverse track. They are using schumpeterian concepts and insights to deal with IPR (cf. Landes and
Posner: 2003).From an entrepreneurial perspective as well, patents and other IPRs are
extremely effective means to reduce uncertainties – and therefore, to ignite
animal spirits and long term expectations - trough building temporary monop-
olies around products, processes, market niches and, eventually, whole mar-
kets (Burlamaqui e Proença: 2003, Nelson: 1996,). However, the word tem-
porary is crucial here because due to creative destruction and as Schumpeter
stated long ago,” a monopoly position is in general no cushion to sleep on”
(1942:102). Patent law
7 itself has inbuilt the rationale to stimulate innova-
tion diffusion. It requires, as a condition to grant a patent, that the patent
application disclose the steps constituting the invention in sufficient detail to
enable readers of the application, if knowledgeable about the relevant tech-
nology, to manufacture the patented product themselves. Of course that in
order to do it properly (legally) anyone who wishes to replicate a patented
product or process will have to negotiate a license with the patentee (Jolly
and Philpott: 2004, part 1, Landes and Posner: 294-295).
It is also true, and very important to notice, that any reader of the patent appli-
cation will be free to “invent around” – to achieve the technological benefits
of the patent by other means, that is, without simply copying the steps of the
patent and , therefore, without infringement. Translated to the evolutionary
economics jargon, what the requirement of public disclosure does is to create
a situation of incomplete apropriability for the patent holder and, therefore, to
reinforce Schumpeter’s insight on temporary monopolies. Summing up, intel-
lectual property rights are sources of dynamic efficiencies can help delivering
the schumpeterian positive sum game represented by falling costs, falling
prices, positive margins (market power) and increased consumer welfare. IPRs
also tends to be particularly costly to protect, that is, their enforcement typi-
cally involves high transaction costs (Landes and Posner: 18). 
So much for the basics. But the picture can get much more complicated
because, as we all know, the devil is in the details. The first observation to
make here relates to a point made by an extremely apt – and almost for-
gotten – analyst in that field: Arnold Plant. As Plant stated in the early thir-
ties, “in the case of physical property, the institution of private property
makes for the preservation of scarce goods…in contrast, property rights in
patents and copyrights make possible the creation of scarcity of the prod-
ucts appropriated… The beneficiary is made the owner of the entire supply
of a product for which there may be no easily obtainable substitute” (Plant:
1974 [1934]: 65-67. Emphasis added). Dynamic inefficiencies
8 can easily
arise here and that alone leaves ground for competition policies
9 to enter
the scene, as we will see shortly. 
5
7 Reference here is to American Patent Law.
8 Meaning the expected (negative) impact on future incentives for competitors to compete (inno-
vate) and future consumer welfare (See Anthony: 2003, section IV).
9 We will use the term competition policies rather than Antitrust here due to the outdated conno-
tation of the latter. We will not be discussing trust-busting but a much subtle and complex set of
behaviours, institutions and policy tools.The second remark concerns the fact that, given the first, that the greater
patent protection (and IPRs in general), the smaller the benefit to the pat-
entee‘s competitors in terms of “inventing around” or innovating on the
shoulders of the patent (or copyright) holder. Given both the complexity and
diversity involving patents and IPRs in general, a one size fits all prescrip-
tion does not look as the best way to handle the matter. Legal-made
dynamic inefficiencies are bound to show in this matter as well.
Competition policies surely have a place here too.
The third critical issue to point to is strategic patenting, that is, the dimen-
sion of business strategy – which is being steadily upgraded in the corpo-
rate strategy’s portfolios during the last decade – devoted to apply for
patents that the company has no intention to use (exploit), but solely to pre-
vent others to profit from it (cf. Varian, Farrel and Shapiro; 2004, part 2
and Landes and Posner, 2003: chapter 11). Obviously this is a major source
of dynamic inefficiency in the sense that it is a strategy bound to drain the
resources from the “labs to the “courts” and also to skyrocket the costs of
litigation and, therefore, of innovation. It displays a crystal clear example of
what Baumol has called “unproductive entrepreneurship” and lends
strength to his arguments on the… 
“…variety of roles among which the entrepreneur’s efforts can be 
reallocated…and some of those roles do not follow the constructive
and innovative script conventionally attributed to that person. 
Indeed, at times the entrepreneur may even lead a parasitical exis
tence that is actually damaging to the economy” (cf. Baumol: 1993,
chapter 2, p 25.But see also chapter 4). 
Evidently, this task of “reallocation of entrepreneurship” is a public policy
and institutional design one.
The fourth one relates to the relationship between IPRs and the “new econ-
omy” (or digitally renewed economy as Paul David would precise it)
10 fea-
tures. In the so-called new economy industries, not products or processes
alone, but intellectual property is the Corporation’s main output or asset.
Overlapping innovations, rapidly falling average total costs, zero marginal
costs, strong network externalities and, therefore, fierce “standards bat-
tles” and pathdependence are their hall mark (Shapiro and Varian:1999,
Best: 2001, De long: 2000, Brynjolfsson and Kahin [eds] 2002). One way
of seeing these is trough the lenses of speeding waves of creative destruc-
tion and, potentially, as more (not less) acute challenges to competitors.
There is an element of true in that picture, but let us suggest here that cre-
ative destruction in a world of increasing returns of scale, learning, and
6
10 Cf. David in Brynjolfsson and Kahin [eds] 2002, p 85.adoption and “winner takes all” markets does not mean anything closer to
some idealized form of “perfect competition” or perfectly contestable mar-
kets, but the replacement of one (or few) dominant firm (firms) by other (or
few others). The replacement of Fairchild by Intel, of Wang and Compaq by
Dell and Toshiba, of IBM by Microsoft and so on. 
Translating to our specific concern, it means that the ability of Corporations
to combine first movers’ advantages with trade secrets, patents, copy-
rights, brand loyalties and network externalities may grant them too secure
monopolistic positions in their markets despite their low rate of (radical)
innovations and not because of it
11. The role for competition policies needs
no comment here. It’s obvious. The normative framework within which
they should take place, on the contrary, is not. We will surface it in the
fourth section below.
The fifth point to be made here, and probably the more general one,  is that
if we think of innovation as a cumulative process where cutting edge
knowledge and know how rests on previous ones and of patents and IPRs
in general as “fences” erected to protect them it’s not difficult to figure out,
depending on the institutional design within which IPRs are handled, the
tension and potential trade-off between the private and public dimensions
of IPR rules. This is the so called argument of the “second enclosure move-
ment” which is now subject of an intense debate (cf. Benkler: 2003, Evans:
2005, Technology Review: 2005, Vol 108, N0 6). According to Evans …
“There are really two halves to the second enclosure movement. The 
defensive side focuses on intensifying the enforcement of protected 
monopoly rights to exclude others from using information that has been 
defined as private property. The offensive side of the agenda involves tak-
ing information that has been considered part of ‘nature’ or the commons
cultural and informational heritage of humankind and transforming it into 
‘private property’. If both halves are successful, the ‘second enclosure 
movement’ would constitute a global re-distribution of property compara-
ble to the eradication of the commons that ushered in agrarian capitalism
in Western Europe 300 years ago” (2005:2. emphasis added). 
Once more, big sources of global dynamic inefficiencies can be perceived
and, therefore, a sizable window for competition policies to step in. 
Lastly it is mandatory to underline the crucial role of the institutional struc-
7
11 See Landes and Posner somehow reluctant recognition of that point (pp 395-6). The case of
Microsoft itself can be used to illustrate the point. The lack of breakthroughs technological innova-
tions, or radical quality-price improvements, is notoriously known in Microsoft. It’s well known that
the “Windows” model was copied from Apple’s user interface – and that itself is a second-hand theft
from Xerox PARC – as well as the tremendous lack of perception, by the company, of the internet
potential until the success of Netscape was obvious. Its also known that the differences between
the versions of Windows and Office that I’m using right know although “ new” display very pale
improvements in relation to their 1998 predecessors.ture – or institutional design – within which the IPRs are enforced. That is,
not the rules as such but the legal enforcement apparatus at hand, the state
structure by which it is supported and the sort of public bureaucracy avail-
able to perform the prescribed duties. It is well known in the literatures on
institutions and economic sociology that these are crucial elements in deter-
mining the degree of success any regulatory system (such as IPRs) can
achieve (Evans: 1995, Dobbin [ed]: 2004, Smelser and Swedberg [eds]:
2005 and Nee and Swedberg [eds] 2005 for excellent discussions on this
theme). Jaffe and Lerner’s thoughtful and provocative work on the recent
changes in the U.S patent system (Jaffe and Lerner: 2004) will serve us in
our discussion of the relationship between its institutional design and the
problems related to the promotion of innovation and “productive entrepre-
neurship” (section 4 below).
3. Competition Policies and the Market Features approach
Competition policies are the regulatory devices used to build a competition-
enhancing environment and to steer corporation’s behaviour into pro-com-
petitive strategies
12. They have to be framed against some sort of theoret-
ical background. The most commonly used is the market failure’s
approach
13. Our departing point here will be the rejection of that approach
to public policies as one who ends up adding more confusion than clarity to
the matter
14. Market failures in relation to what? The perfect competition
model should be the answer. Being so, all markets are robust in market fail-
ures…They should, therefore, be all subjected to corrections. But then,
another tricky question arises: market failures’ corrections according to
what blueprint? The perfect competition model, again. But where can we
find empirical evidence to support that model’s relevance for public policy
usage (although there is plenty to reject it)? Or, how can we “test” this
model in order to be assured of its efficiency (has anyone ever heard of an
8
12 In the sense, as the U. S Supreme Court has stated (in a very schumpeterian fashion), of legit-
imately acquiring competitive advantages trough superior performance (as displayed by superior
products, processes, business acumen or historic accident (Anthony; 2003 section III)
13 For a clear exposition and of that approach as well as to a public-choice oriented critique of it,
see: Mitchell and Simmons: 1994, part 1. Both the Chicago Scholl and its heir, the public-choice per-
spective, have pioneered the criticisms to that approach by trying to show that most of what was
presented by market failures turned to be children of Government failures. But their root is neo-lib-
eral in the sense that they stick to the notion of a self-regulated market and with the perfect com-
petition model as its “proof”. Ours will be, instead, an evolutionay-institutionalist based rejection, and
will leave spacious room for the “role of state” in forging competition policies (See Burlamaqui: 2000
for a more general discussion of that matter). 
14 The paper by Nelson, Dosi, Cimolli and Stiglitz given at the IPD meeting in Rio (March,17-18)
makes the same point but does not pursue, in that work, an alternative departure point. (Nelson et
alii: 2005, p 2-3).9
actual measurement of a pareto-optimum?)? It doesn’t get us too far….
15 
In its place, we will submit a market features approach. By market features
approach we mean an analytical perspective concerned with and taking into
account institutional diversity, sector specificities, distinctive dynamics
both in their technological and industrial dimension, as well as in its regula-
tory and legal aspects and differentiated degrees of market power as the
backbone of any market’s actual workings. It’s a conceptual framework
whose main advantage is that it does not fight the empirical evidence but
rather accommodates it. It does not provide us with a one size fits all
receipt but with analytical flexibility instead. And, in our specific subject, it
opens space for both sector specific competition policies and for differenti-
ated intellectual property rules.
Interestingly enough, the idea of a market features approach is not new. It
comes from that undeservedly neglected tradition that unites scholars such
as George Shackle and Ludwig Lachmann, a tradition that could very well
be labelled as Austrian Keynesianism (See Lachmann: 1986 and Vaughn:
1994 on that matter).The specific idea of a market’s taxonomy comes from
Lachmann’s last book in his discussion of markets as economic processes
embedded in institutions. As Vaughn explains it, Lachmann argues that…
“Instead of examining the world through the lens of the ‘market’ we need
to develop ideal types of particular kinds of markets: assets markets ver
sus production markets, fix-price versus flex-price markets, markets domi
nated by merchants versus markets dominated by salesmen. Such distinc
tions will make a difference as to how markets adjust to change” 
(Lachmann: 1986,128 apud Vaughn; 1994,159, emphasis added).
This was a brilliant insight, but it was left more or less as it was first sub-
mitted. For our concerns, it offers as a very promising alternative departing
point both for positive and for normative purposes. In that vein, some fur-
ther elements to be used in “mapping” market features are:
· Concentration measures and market leaderships ,
· Degree of technological complexity (measured by the ratio of
R&D to sales), 
· Rate of innovation (measured by number of patent and copy-
rights granted versus new products actually being marketed),
15 After all, the perfect competition model should be an ideal type, in the weberian sense of the
concept: a construct that accentuates certain properties found in reality and exaggerates them for
purposes of organizing and making sense of the empirical data. That means that the construct should
be abstract but empirically relevant. The problem is that none of the core hypothesis of the model –
perfect information, product homogeneity, free entry and exit (absence of sunk costs), price taking
behavior (absence of market power) absence of increasing returns and tendency towards equilibri-
um – are found in reality thus making the model useless either for positive or normative usage (some-
thing that Frank Hahn, for instance, spelled out several times in his works. See Hahn: 1984).10
· Patenting strategies (patents earned versus patents actually 
used – or effectively licensed plus degree of litigation involving 
patent claims),
· Price behaviour (price’s movement in time. Decreasing, increasing,
stable?),
· Profits made by the leading firms and their evolution,
· Regulatory apparatus embedding the market or sector under, 
concern (standards, requirements, frequency of government 
stepping in…), 
· legal characteristics (enforcement mechanisms at hand, type of 
contracts used, penalties..)     
These, of course, do not exhaust the possibilities of mapping, but they
allow for a much more realistic – although possibly less elegant (but we are
not in the fashion business here) – assessment of their differentiated work-
ings and as to how they are likely to adjust (or give rise) to change. That
perspective still has to be properly developed, but it will enable theory to be
relevant and useful from the point of view empirical reality – and policy. It
is also in line, for instance, with the recent findings by Carlton and Gertner
in their NBER working paper on Intellectual property, Antitrust and Strategic
Behaviour (wp no 8976, 2002) where they state that ” Only detailed study
of the industry of concern has the possibility of uncovering reliable rela-
tionships between innovation and industry behaviour” (2002; p 30). There
is clearly a very promising theoretical road to be travelled here. Let us close
this section by saying that under a schumpeterian perspective, the market
features perspective should be the departing point for the discussion of
competition policies.  
4. Market Features, Competition Policies and Intellectual Property Rights   
The market features approach delineated above has as its policy counter-
part a market shaping perspective. The main idea here is that it is possible
- and desirable – to (trough institutional building, legal change and adminis-
trative guidance) re-design market features as well as regulatory mecha-
nisms and proceedings in order to pursue the major, schumpeterian, policy
outline of promoting and regulating entrepreneurial success. Within that
approach, the main proposition we will submit is that the theory of schum-
peterian competition is the most adequate one to allow for the simultane-
ous treatment of competition policies and intellectual property issues. The
general rule under which both should be articulated is the promotion of
innovation plus the assurance of its diffusion, and this implies, again, simul-
taneously, promoting and regulating entrepreneurial success. This pair of
words, promoting and regulating, is crucial, in the sense that both the pri-
vate and the public sides of competition policies and of institutional designs
should be addressed.   11
16 Smaller, Faster, Cheaper, Better.
17 That is, a legally enforced temporary monopoly.
From that angle, competition policies should be based on market features
and should use, extensively, market shaping devices in order to perform
creative destruction management, meaning to shape markets in order to
reduce dynamic inefficiencies and increase dynamic efficiencies coming
from schumpeterian competition, a form of competition that, as we point-
ed out, has intellectual property rights as its one of it’s core weapons and
competitive conflicts as one of it’s main outcomes. From the corporations’
perspective, competition policies should not be about harassing “bigness”
or preventing “market power”, but about preventing “too secure monopo-
lies”, and especially those not based in – and thriving on - superior techno-
logical performance as shown by the “SFCB combo“
16. 
More concretely, competition policies should shape markets and drive cor-
porations towards establishing research coordination, pushing cooperative
standard’s setting, preserving multiple sources of experimentation, moni-
toring patent pools, establishing differentiated patent and copyrights
lengths and severely punishing both “unproductive patenting” behaviour
and  attempts by corporations to close markets trough creating their own
proprietary closed systems (See Carlton and Gertner: 2002, for a similar line
of reasoning).         
Having that in mind, we will try to address more specifically the, difficult,
question of how to use competition policies to deal with the dynamic inef-
ficiencies we pointed out in the second section above. Regarding the first
one, Plant’s argument on patents making the beneficiary… “the owner of
the entire supply of a product for which there may be no easily obtainable
substitute”, it’s a serious one. If we think of a cleaver, but not radical, inno-
vation (for instance, Post it ® from 3M) it should not raise major concerns
from competition policy-makers, but what if it is a general purpose tech-
nology in embryo (for instance the new genetic engineering research tools
or a particular DNA sequence)? Then Plant’s point would hold completely
and the granting of the patent would create a very substantial monopoly for
the owner, and potentially prevent others from exploiting it – that is, to
slow its diffusion. 
Those examples highlight the importance of the market features
approach– including its technological dimension as underlined. In cases
like the ones involving general purpose technologies the IPR policy should
be much more rigorously examined and carefully handed. A possible “tool”
for dealing with that would be, for the Government, to claim a golden
share in the IPR system (especially patents and copyrights but including
trade secrets) by which it would be able to convert a property right previ-
ously granted
17 into a general public license should the owner refuse, after12
establishing his first mover advantage
18, to behave cooperatively, that is
to license it broadly and fairly.
Summing up: Radical innovations and, especially, general purpose tech-
nologies should be subjected to a special IPR regime where the
Government’s administrative guidance should be able, if needed, to “shape”
the market towards a more competitive institutional design (practically: in
the direction of monopolistic competition but away from too secure – even
if temporary – monopolies). 
This brings us to our second point, which is closely related to first, referring
to the strength of the protection granted. We then observed that given both
the complexity and diversity involving patents and IPRs in general, a one size
fits all prescription does not look as the best way to handle the matter. The
20 years length of a patent (or of the rules governing copyrights and regis-
trations) is certainly not a “scientific established outcome” (Landes and
Posner). It is, rather, a convention. That is to say, it is an institutional-legal
construct that, as such, can very well be questioned and changed. On the
other hand, as Jaffe and Lerner adduce –and very much in line with the mar-
ket features approach – “In the world of theoretical patent analysis it is easy
to show that the attributes of patent protection should vary depending on
the characteristics of the technology” (p 203). 
But hey then expose several reasons why this differential treatment
approach would not work in practical terms (pp.203-205). The difficulties
to deal with technologies – classify them and quantify their impact empiri-
cally – plus the political lobbying by corporations (to get special treatment)
are the main arguments submitted by the authors. We are in partial agree-
ment with them as to having pure technological considerations serving as
the basis for policy, as well as to the “rent-seeking” dangers surrounding
any sort of differential treatment. But let us note that differential treatment
is the core of both technological and industrial policies, regardless of where
they are crafted, for instance South Korea, China, Ireland or the U.S. That
is: they can work.
To be less abstract on the matter, let us propose this broad guideline for
competition policies: many sizes under the same rule. By this we offer the
following line of reasoning. The length and broadness of patent protection
– as well as innovations protected by copyrights – should be linked to the
18 Meaning: being able to recover his costs, establish his a robust competitive advantage, enjoy a
sizable profit stream but not being able to exclude others from using and inventing around his inno-
vation or prostate its diffusion. Taking as an example the Microsoft case, the battle shouldn’t be
about “breaking” the company. The golden share would allow the Government to force Microsoft to
publish its source code. An open code would quickly get cleaned up and improved, consumers would
benefit and new entrants would probably show, helping ignite the innovation race and dislodging
Microsoft from its monopoly position but preserving the company’s market power and ability to inno-
vate.     13
19 R&D expenses as a percentage of the applicant’s sales or assets. Assuming that those R&D
intensive industries are also the one bearing more fixed and sunk costs. Plus, near future planned
expenses tied to the “birth” of an innovation or technology should be in the contract granting the
rights and their actual production the enabling mechanism to conclude the exam. Otherwise, patent
pending would be a sot of “reasonable doubt” proviso.
20 A very difficult emerging theme here is the protection to be given to traditional knowledge, DOC
issues and related others. We acknowledge its importance but will not deal with that in that paper.
disbursements in R&D made or to be made
19 by applicants. Being so, big
research budgets (in relative terms to the company’s size) would, in princi-
ple, qualify better than “historical accidents” to earn legitimate protection.
The same rule allowing for different sizes. …
20
As to the third source of dynamic inefficiencies referred above, strategic
patenting, it should be dealt with in a somewhat Ricardian way: earned but
unused patents should be classified as fertile but not cultivated pieces of
land in an environment structurally constrained by scarcity. They should be
taxed, and progressively so. After an initial launching period break, each
year of idleness in the commercialization of the patent should give rise to a
severe fine whose exact amount should be figured out by specialists in the
field, but could very well be a (increasing) percentage of the patentee sales
or assets. Rigorous? Yes, but patents and IPRs in general are subjects of
public interest. Too important to be left to markets and lawyers to judge.
Besides, the competition policy we are pointing to should discourage the
sort of unproductive entrepreneurship that Baumol has been talking about
for more than a decade, a type of legal entrepreneurship that turns law
firms into very big and profitable corporations but with zero impact on the
economy’s real productivity. It would, to sum up; help to trigger the “relo-
cation of entrepreneurship” – from courts back to labs – discussed, and
claimed, by Baumol.
The fourth point outlined (in section 2 above) relates to the relationship
between the “digitally renewed economy” and intellectual property issues,
and particularly to the risk of winner takes all markets outcomes or, from
the point of view of corporations, of the occurrence of locking competitors
out due to the combination of increasing returns, network externalities,
path-dependency and stronger IPRs protection (cf. Varian, Farrel and
Shapiro: 2004, Carlton and Gertner: 2002). Competition policies here
should pursue, very aggressively if needed, public subsidization of stan-
dards development, cooperative standard’s setting, stimulus to (instead of
restriction on) on research joint ventures and other forms of research coor-
dination (Carlton and Gertner: 2002: 3-7) and venture capital financing to
multiple sources of experimentation (Bartzokas and Mani, eds: 2004). A
“less kind, less gentle patent system” as Jaffe and Lerner put it (203) were
patents turn to be much harder to get and relatively easier to share would
also be very helpful in that vein.
The fifth issue raised above concerns the recent wave of strengthening IPRs
and its connection to a potential “second enclosure movement”. This move-14
21 And he adds that one can clearly see that , for instance, by noticing that most of what we do
on the Internet runs on software produced by tens of thousands of volunteers, working together in
a way that is fundamentally more closely related to a community than to a hierarchical big corpora-
tion standing alone.
ment is seen by the so-called “progressive IP lawyers”, software program-
mers and a sizable number of social and natural scientists of various extrac-
tions as a recipe for global monopoly. One that is likely to stifle innovation
at the same time it concentrates wealth (See Moglen: 2003, Benkler: 2003
and Evans: 2005). On the basis of this argument there is an emerging alter-
native being articulated by some of those groups called “the new commons”.
As Evans has aptly put it, this alternative is “attractive both because of its
distributional implications and because of its potential for raising the rate of
innovation and value creation” (2005:3). The basis of the “new commons
comes from a redefinition of “ownership”: from the focus on the right to
exclude to the focus on the right to distribute (disseminate). 
The key idea here is that once property rights are redefined along the lines
pioneered by the open source software movement community, a much
more egalitarian redistribution of intangible assets and a more powerful
rationale to foster innovations will be able to emerge. This rationale is one
that unfolds from the characteristics of the networked information econo-
my — an economy of information, knowledge, and culture that flow over a
ubiquitous, decentralized network. In that environment, as Benker remarks,
productivity and growth can be sustained in a pattern that differs funda-
mentally from the industrial information economy of the twentieth century
in two crucial characteristics. First, non-market production can play a much
more important role than it could in the physical economy. Individuals work-
ing alongside corporations – and not corporations alone – can make a real
difference in generation of innovative solutions and productivity gains
(Benkler: 2003, 1)
21 Second, radically decentralized production and distri-
bution, whether market-based or not, can similarly play a much more impor-
tant role by increasing the diversity of ways of organizing production and
consumption and, therefore, by increasing the sources and possibilities for
multiple forms of experimentation. 
This is clearly a global issue and – both because of that, and also due to
the under theorized relationship between competition policies and intellec-
tual property rights – a very difficult one to handle. It will certainly require
an active involvement of governments in helping the development of open
source systems and towards more general public licenses oriented intellec-
tual property rights regimes. It will also require international cooperation,
both very turbulent matters from a power-politics perspective.
Nevertheless, the recent decisions by IBM and Nokia , for instance, to put
part of their patents in the public domain suggests that there is perhaps
more room for maneuver than that the skeptical analyst would expect. 15
22 Why do we want to illustrate that point with the U.S system? Simply because it is the most
powerful patent system in the world and also the most likely to be mimicked by “emergent
economies”.
23 On the problems of relying in trials by juries in patent cases, see pp 123-126 of their book.
Finally, there is the issue of the, crucial, role of the institutional structure –
or institutional design – within which the IPRs are enforced. This brings us
to Jaffe and Lerner discussion of the recent institutional-design changes in
the U.S patent system and its deleterious effects on innovation
22. Their
story unfolds around two fundamental changes in the legal-institutional
foundations of the system. The first in 1982 was a change in the process
by which patent cases were handled. From then on, instead of the twelve
regional courts of appeal, one single, specialized, appeals court began to
process all the requests: The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC). This, per se, could have been a positive change, injecting homo-
geneity in a potentially fragmented system. This actually happened, but it
also happened that those were the years of the Japanese challenge, of
America’s lost competitiveness, of Reagan’s extreme pro-business policies.
And apparently this was reflected in the new court’s way of interpreting
patent law “to make it easier to get, easier to enforce patents against oth-
ers, easier to get large financial awards from such enforcement, and hard-
er for those accused of infringing patents to challenge the patents’ validi-
ty” (Jaffe and Lerner: 2004, 2-11). 
The second change dates from the early nineties when the Congress mod-
ified Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO) financial basis, turning it into a
profit-centre, a service agency whose costs of operation should be covered
by the fees paid the patent applicants – or its clients (ibid). Together these
two changes made a huge impact. According to the authors, they trans-
formed a formerly efficient institution in its commitment to foster and pro-
tect innovation into a lawyers’ paradise, and a very powerful generator of
unproductive entrepreneurship and, therefore, into a severely dysfunctional
institution. In order to be “efficient” the PTO started to examine - and grant
– as many patents as it could, regardless of the quality and reliability of the
examination process, to be able to “survive”. Between 1983 and 2002 the
patents granted increased from about 62,000/year to 177,000/year. The
number of patent applications has also ballooned. There have reached the
figure of about 350,000 per year for 2002-2003 (Jaffe and Lerner, 11).
The share of patent cases tried before juries also skyrocket: from less than
3 percent between 1940 and 1959 to roughly 70 percent in 2000
23 (Jaffe
and Lerner, 123).
In analytical terms what has happened was the replacement of a quasi-
weberian bureaucracy by a new public management (NPM) inspired institu-
tional design in order to “regulate” a crucially important part of knowledge16
management
24. The results were dismal in the sense that they reinforced
the incentives towards strategic patenting and patent litigation (which con-
sumes literally billions of dollars) without any clear impact in innovation
inducement or on the rate of innovation (see Noll: 2004 on that issue). To
wrap up the point, we could say, paraphrasing Solow that the benefits of
stronger patent protection and increased room for strategic patenting have
failed to show up, except in the big patent portfolio holders’ licensing rev-
enues, and in the dedicated law firm’s balance sheets… On the sort of
detailed institutional re-design which ought to be done in order to improve
patent quality; we will point the reader to the excellent discussion by Jaffe
and Lerner. 
However, we would like to add a couple of comments to theirs referring not
specially to the U. S system, but to more general remarks concerning insti-
tutional design. The first is that it is our perception that patents and intel-
lectual property in general is too important nowadays to be left to lawyers
and juries, and a single PTO lead us to suggest that they should rather be
restructured, institutionally speaking in the form of a transversal regulatory
agency working in coordination with the existing ones, were field experts
from sectoral agencies but trained in patent and IP analysis would be the
examiners. Judges and courts (but not juries) should be the “last resort” in
those matters, not the first. 
Secondly, that this agency should structured along “weberian lines”, which
are a set of offices in which appointed civil servants operate under the prin-
ciples of merit selection, expertise, hierarchy, the division of labor, exclu-
sive employment, career advancement and legality.  This type of rationali-
ty – Weber’s key term – would increase speed, scope, predictability, and
cost-effectiveness. (Weber 1922: esp. 124-130, Drechsler: 2005).
Although checks and balances structured as embedded autonomy mecha-
nisms should be added to that picture in order to avoid excessive bureau-
cratic insulation (cf. Evans: 1995), the weberianess of the design ought to
be preserved.   
5. Conclusion  
The policy-institutions framework resulting from the discussion above
should be flexible and pragmatic, and should have creative destruction
management – or the promotion and regulation of entrepreneurial success
– as its main goal. In its competition policies dimension, it should be not
anti-bigness but anti unproductive entrepreneurship (Baumol: 1993 and
24 As Drechsler aptly sums it, NPM is the transfer of business and market principles and manage-
ment techniques from the private into the public sector, symbiotic with and based on a neo-liberal
understanding of state and economy. The goal, therefore, is a slim, reduced, minimal state in which
any public activity is decreased and, if at all, exercised according to business principles of efficien-
cy. NPM is based on the understanding that all human behavior is always motivated by self-interest
and, specifically, profit maximization (cf. 2005, 1).17
2002), pro-efficiency but not libertarian (in the “Chicago Scholl” sense of
letting the market, almost always, take care of its own problems) and, espe-
cially, it should be pro-cooperation, leaving room for business networks to
thrive and for state sponsored administrative guidance’s initiatives. It should
also engineer policies towards the development of multiple sources of
experimentation and should allow room for industrial and technology poli-
cies without jeopardizing its own core theoretical assumptions.
In its intellectual property dimension, it should not point to a “one size fits
all” institutional design
25 and should not pursue the maximum protection of
monopolistic rents as both the U.S PTO and the WTO seem to be doing,
but to search for the minimal common denominator, allowing for institu-
tional and technological diversity and distinctive developmental strategies.
It should take into account the asymmetries in the distance to the “devel-
opment frontier” among countries and regions echoing Joseph Stiglitz’s
recent, and wise, remark that “Intellectual property is important for sure,
but the appropriated IPR system for an emerging country is different from
the IPR system best fitting already developed nations” (Stiglitz: 2005, my
version back to English. LB)
26. 
None of these policy prescriptions will be achieved without a huge dose of
“strategic state action” and most of them will require a high degree of inter-
national cooperation. Uneasy tasks therefore. Nonetheless, the expected
result, to which this paper intends to be a small contribution, will be a the-
ory-policy framework linking market features to schumpeterian competition
and competition policies to intellectual property rights’ management which
will allow room for catching-up initiatives and to the (re) construction of
development strategies in order to reverse the dismal picture shown in
Coriat, Cimoli and Primi (2005: p16): 
“To sum up, weak institutional and personnel capabilities in intel-
lectual property systems’ management, reduced capacity of negoti-
ating intellectual property rights and regime domain and the exis-
tence of monopolistic markets where regional enterprises and eco-
nomic agents perform at the lowest levels of international hierar-
chies, depict an displeasing scenario where Latin American and 
25 It should not , therefore, be framed , as Coriat, Cimoli and Primi indicate in a just released paper,
as an American “export”: it is essential to note that recent (dramatic) changes in IP law have been
strongly embedded in the specificities of an American patent law that is predicated on a common
law regime wherein the essential criterion for patentability is the “utility” the invention is deemed to
have. Utility, a property that refers to products of “useful arts”, basically involves industrial and
commercial advances enabled by this invention. Under these conditions, in our opinion the afore-
mentioned change was in fact that suddenly it was enough to relax or change the meaning of the
word “utility” for non-patentable areas to become patentable. (Coriat Cimoli and Primi: 2005, p 4).
26 One of main reasons for that – although certainly not the only one – being the fact that the big
pharmaceutical companies perform obscene price discrimination among nations (cf. Varian, Farrel
and Shapiro; 2004, p 52) and almost always refuse to engage in poor and emerging countrie’s pub-
lic policies oriented towards health-care.18
Caribbean countries have weak negotiation powers in terms of intel-
lectual property, scantly use the windows of opportunities that cur-
rent agreements offer and suffer of structural weakness in terms of
capacities of proposing regionally-tailored changes in the rules’ 
games in order to support domestic technological and innovation 
capabilities”
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